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Narrow Content, by Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018. Pp. 218. 
 
Bo believes that snow is white; Hilary hopes that the plane will land safely; Frankie fears that 
winter has come too soon. Such sentences attribute thoughts to thinkers. The content of the 
thoughts attributed are specified by the relevant ‘that’-clauses: that snow is white; that the plane 
will land safely; that winter has come too soon. The central question with which Juhani Yli-
Vakkuri and John Hawthorne are concerned in their recent book Narrow Content is whether 
the contents of a subject’s thoughts are fully determined by properties ‘internal’ to her, or 
whether they depend in part on ‘what is going on in the outside world’ (p. 3). According to the 
former, internalist option, content is narrow; according to the latter, externalist option, content 
is broad. Narrow Content provides a sustained argument against narrow content, and hence in 
favour of externalism. Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne do not argue that there are no narrow 
content assignments to thoughts (there are, they say, an infinite number of them); they argue 
that there are no theoretically significant narrow content assignments. If true, this would 
undermine the rationale for advocating narrow content of any kind. 
The Introduction to the book outlines the framework within which the central question 
is to be addressed. Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne take thought-tokens (thoughts) as the primary 
bearers of content, and, in line with what they take to be ‘fairly standard terminology’ (p. 2), 
they take the contents of thoughts to be truth-evaluable propositions. The question of whether 
the extension of a thought or thought-constituent is narrow is taken to be a different question 
from the question of whether the content of a thought is narrow. With regard to extensions, the 
authors take it as ‘already completely obvious that which object a thought is about is not fully 
determined by what goes on inside the agent of the thought’ (p. 3, original emphasis). 
Demonstratives and proper names provide familiar examples. Thus when Sally utters the 
sentence ‘That marble belongs to Marv’ she may express a thought about Marble 1 and Marv, 
or, in different circumstances, a thought about Marble 2 and Twin Marv, consistent with no 
difference in Sally’s inner goings-on. Putnam’s example of Twin Earth and his hypothesis of 
the division of linguistic labour demonstrate that the extension of thought-constituents 
corresponding to general terms such as ‘water’ and ‘sirloin’ (the authors’ example) also depend, 
at least in part, on goings-on outside the agent. (Putnam, 1975). Further, since Sally’s thought 
that there’s a dog in front of her will be true when the object in front of her is a dog, but false 
when it’s a cleverly-disguised cat ‘the extension (truth value) of an entire thought can vary 
across possible situations even while the insides of the thinker remain the same’ (p. 5).  
The claim that content can vary across possible situations while inner goings-on remain 
the same is the pivotal claim. To illustrate the claim, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne appeal to 
what they call ‘Burge’s test’ for difference of content: ‘if the content of one thought can be 
specified by a particular ‘that’-clause but the content of another thought cannot be specified by 
the same ‘that’-clause, then the contents are distinct’ (p. 9). This test, they maintain, is 
recognised by Burge to show first, that thought constituents corresponding to names and 
demonstratives will not be fixed by inner goings-on, and second, that thought constituents 
corresponding to general terms such as ‘arthritis’ and ‘sofa’ will not be fixed by inner goings-
on. They say ‘[i]t is worth some emphasis that Burge’s test for content difference does not 
detect any difference between indexical and non-indexical expressions (as Burge himself 
recognized)’ (p. 11) and go on to conclude ‘[a]s far as mental content is concerned, then, there 
is no reason at all to posit a difference between thoughts expressed using indexical words and 
others’ (p. 12). The fact that Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne treat the contents of indexical and 
non-indexical thoughts in the same way is of central importance to how they frame their 
arguments against narrow content. It grounds the foundational (and apparently innocuous) 
claim that the contents of thoughts are truth-evaluable propositions; and it licenses the central 
role that names and demonstratives play in their arguments throughout the book.  
The application of Burge’s test to general terms is familiar. Given the hypothesised 
differences surrounding the use of the term ‘arthritis’ in the relevant communities, Alf’s belief 
can be ascribed using the clause ‘that he has arthritis in his thigh’, whereas Twin Alf’s belief 
cannot. (Burge, 1979). The contents of their thoughts are therefore, according to Burge’s test, 
distinct. Here is Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s application of Burge’s test to indexical terms. 
Bert and Twin Bert each sincerely asserts ‘I am human’. Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne write: 
‘The thoughts they express by that sentence could be correctly ascribed using the clause “that 
he is human”. However, Bert’s thought could also be correctly ascribed (if somewhat 
redundantly) using “that Bert is human”, while Twin Bert’s thought could not. By Burge’s test, 
then, we must conclude that the thoughts differ in content.’ (p. 11). But the application of 
Burge’s test to indexical thoughts does not fit exegetically with what Burge says. Throughout 
his writing, Burge clearly distinguishes the indexical from the non-indexical case at the level 
of content by distinguishing content that is true or false simpliciter from content that is ‘true of 
or false of objects to which the subject bears a non-conceptual, quasi-indexical relation’ (Burge, 
1980 p. 54, original emphasis; see also, for example, Burge 1977, 1982). This, Burge maintains, 
is what underpins the de re / de dicto distinction. Content that is true of or false of objects, 
according to Burge, is akin to a predicational fragment; it is not fully propositional and hence 
non-truth-evaluable. It is this kind of content that Burge takes sentences containing indexicals 
(including demonstratives and singular uses of proper names) to express. This means that 
according to Burge, Bert’s and Twin Bert’s thoughts do not differ in content at all. Similarly, 
according to Burge the content of the thought Sally expresses when she utters ‘That marble 
belongs to Marv’ will remain the same whether it is thought of Marble 1 and Marv or thought 
of Marble 2 and Twin Marv. The upshot is that Burge’s test cannot show that indexical thought 
contents can vary across possible situations in which the internal goings-on of the agent remain 
the same without assuming a notion of indexical thought content that Burge explicitly rejects.  
Setting aside issues of Burge exegesis, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne are, of course, free 
to provide an account of content (specifically indexical thought content) that differs from 
Burge’s, and hence free to treat the contents of indexical and non-indexical thoughts as of a 
kind. What they must not do, however, is assume an extensional understanding of indexical 
content which begs the question against the narrow content theorist. But treating Bert’s and 
Twin Bert’s thoughts as differing in content, as Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne advocate, looks 
dangerously close to doing just that. A similar issue arises from treating Bert’s thought that he 
is human and Bert’s thought that Bert is human as having the same content. Further, even if 
Burge’s distinction between content that is true or false simpliciter and content that is true of 
or false of objects is not ultimately accepted, its plausibility renders controversial the (allegedly 
innocuous) foundational claim that the contents of thoughts are truth-evaluable propositions; it 
also brings into question the heavy and indiscriminate reliance on proper names and 
demonstratives in the primary examples throughout the book.  
Chapter 1, ‘What is narrow content?’ aims to ‘clarify and make precise’ (p. 17) the key 
notions of content and narrowness. Taking the ordinary notion of content first, Yli-Vakkuri and 
Hawthorne maintain that propositional attitude attributions, the superficial form of which is 
given in (1), have ‘something like (2) as their underlying logical form’ (p. 19): 
 
(1) x Vs that p 
(2) ∃e (AGENT (e, x) ∧ CONTENT (e, that p) ∧ V (e)) 
 
(2) involves explicit quantification over events (thinkings) and makes explicit mention of a 
relation (written as ‘CONTENT’) that, say Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, necessarily relates each 
thought to exactly one content. Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne call this relation the ur-content 
assignment and call the value of the ur-content assignment for a particular thought its ur-
content. ‘Thus the ur-content of your belief that there are no green baboons is (the proposition) 
that there are no green baboons’ (p. 19). Ur-content, then, is content as ordinarily understood. 
The overarching approach to content they adopt is, as they say, ‘very much in line with 
standard formal semantics for natural languages’ (p. 24) in the tradition of, for example, Kaplan 
(1989) and Lewis (1980). On this approach, ‘contents, whatever else they may do, determine 
truth values, at least relative to indices’, which is to say that ‘each content has a unique truth 
value at each index’ (p. 24). Taking ‘i’, ‘i′’, ‘i″’, … as variables for indices and using ‘I’ to 
designate the set of all indices, each content C determines a function f from indices to truth 
values such that, for each i ∈ I, f (i) = T if C is true at i and F otherwise. This function is said 
to be the intension of C, although the question of which alethic parameters (for example, worlds, 
times, agents) feature in the indices is left open as a substantive question about the metaphysics 
of content (pp. 24-5).  
Narrowness, taken as a property of content assignments, is defined as follows: ‘a 
content assignment [[.]] is narrow just in case the value of [[.]] for a thought is determined (in 
the sense of strong local supervenience) by the maximal way in which the thought relates to 
the way the agent of the thought is in intrinsic, qualitative respects’ and ‘the maximal way in 
which a thought so relates to its agent’ is called its ‘Qualitative Agential Profile (QAP)’ (p. 30). 
More precisely, ‘a content assignment [[.]] is narrow just in case it satisfies the following 
condition: 
 
 ∀α∀Q∀C((QAP(α) = Q ∧ [[α]] = C) →  ∀β(QAP(β) = Q →[[β]] = C)) 
 
i.e., necessarily, if a thought with a certain QAP, Q, has a certain [[.]]-content, C, then, 
necessarily, any thought whose QAP is Q has C as its [[.]]-content’ (p. 34).  
 Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne argue, convincingly, that there are ‘infinitely many narrow 
content assignments that are of no theoretical interest’ (p. 39). The important question, then, is 
whether there is a narrow content assignment that satisfies some further, non-trivial condition 
or set of conditions that renders it of theoretical significance. Advocates of narrow content 
clearly maintain that there is, although different theorists emphasise different conditions as the 
theoretically significant ones. Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne helpfully categorise such conditions 
into two broad families: structural conditions and explanatory conditions. Structural conditions 
include truth-conditionality and truth-functional compositionality. Explanatory conditions 
include accounting for ur-content (as defined previously), providing a supervenience base for 
rationality, accounting for privileged access, explaining action and explaining phenomenal 
intentionality. Each condition imposes a constraint on admissible narrow content assignments. 
Throughout the course of the book, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne articulate the conditions and 
aim to demonstrate just how demanding each condition is. They go on to argue that there is no 
unique narrow content assignment that meets all of, or even a significant number of, the 
structural and explanatory conditions cited. As a result, the conclusion of the book is that there 
is no theoretically significant narrow content assignment, and hence no theoretical reason to 
advocate narrow content. 
Chapter 2, ‘Truth-conditionality’, looks in detail at the first of the structural constraints. 
Truth-conditionality, as Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne understand it, requires more than that a 
content assignment necessarily assigns to each thought a content that has a truth condition. 
‘After all’, they say ‘every content assignment, whether narrow or broad, satisfies this 
condition’ (p. 64). What truth-conditionality understood as a genuine constraint on a 
theoretically significant content assignment requires is that, necessarily, the content assigned 
to a thought determines the genuine truth value of the thought at the index of the thought. That 
is, the assignment must match with our intuitive judgements about the truth value of each 
relevant thought. This connects with the foundational claim that the contents of thoughts are 
truth-evaluable propositions, and with the clearly-stated assumption that the ur-content 
assignment is truth-conditional: ‘the ur-content assignment necessarily assigns to each thought 
a content that determines, at the index of the thought, the truth value of the thought’ (p. 27). 
The problem, according to Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, is that ‘the claim that there is a truth-
conditional narrow content assignment, by logic alone, forces its adherents to accept one of 
two positions. Either they must deny the metaphysical possibility of certain kinds of symmetry 
that are prima facie metaphysically possible [i.e. close variants of Putnam’s (1975) Twin Earth 
scenario], or they must embrace ... some form of relativism that no one in the literature on 
relativist semantics has yet seriously considered’ (p. 64). 
The claim, then, is that the narrow content theorist faces a dilemma. Either narrow 
content assignments deliver the wrong truth conditions to thought contents by denying Putnam 
and Burge’s conclusion that ‘Doppelgänger-related’ thoughts in Twin Earth scenarios have 
different truth conditions, or narrow content assignments are subject to an unacceptable 
‘parameter proliferation’ (p. 71), being true or false only relative to an ever-increasing number 
of alethic parameters. The dilemma is an interesting one that structures the chapter, with Yli-
Vakkuri and Hawthorne arguing against the claim that a narrow content assignment can meet 
the truth-conditionality constraint by appeal to a series of ever more convoluted examples 
involving characters such as Loop Lady, Mirror Man, and Mirror Angel. In each scenario we 
are offered a reason to think that the relevant Doppelgänger-related thoughts have different 
truth conditions unless relativized to yet another alethic parameter: world, agent, time, personal 
time, location… finally forcing a choice between ‘thought relativism’, according to which ‘the 
thought itself is included in its index’ (p. 80) or ‘extension assignment relativism’, according 
to which ‘the extension determined by a narrow content varies with assignments of extensions 
to some but not all of the semantically simple constituents of thoughts … the special 
constituents’ (p. 81, original emphasis).  
Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne argue convincingly that the options to which the second 
horn of the dilemma lead are problematic. The only plausible way to avoid such problematic 
options, it would seem, is to grasp the first horn of the dilemma, and embrace the claim that 
Doppelgänger-related thoughts in Twin Earth scenarios have the same truth conditions. Note 
that grasping the first horn of the dilemma does not involve denying the metaphysical 
possibility of Twin-Earth-style scenarios; it requires rejecting a particular interpretation of the 
Twin-Earth-style scenarios that, following Putnam and Burge, it has become standard to accept. 
But the standard interpretation is not universally accepted. For example, it is challenged by 
Segal (2000), who advocates a kind of narrow content. According to Segal, Oscar on Earth and 
Twin Oscar on Twin Earth have the same belief despite the different molecular constitutions 
of the watery stuff in their respective environments, and Alf and Twin Alf have the same 
belief—the belief that they have tharthritis in the thigh—despite the different linguistic 
practices of their respective communities. Segal, then, is an example of a narrow content 
theorist who embraces the first horn of Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s dilemma at least with 
respect to thoughts expressed by sentences containing general, non-indexical terms. 
Unfortunately, since the examples used by Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne feature names and 
demonstratives rather than general terms, and since Segal, like Burge but unlike Yli-Vakkuri 
and Hawthorne, distinguishes the content of indexical thoughts from the content of non-
indexical thoughts, Segal’s position, which is perhaps the most plausible internalist position, 
appears to be unaffected by Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s arguments. (See Sawyer 2018). 
Chapter 3, ‘Narrow content and ur-content,’ distinguishes between what Yli-Vakkuri 
and Hawthorne call ‘sectarian internalism’, according to which the ur-content assignment is 
narrow, and ‘ecumenical internalism’, according to which the ur-content assignment is broad 
but ‘there is some other content assignment that is both narrow and occupies some interesting 
theoretical role’ (p. 97). Effectively, sectarian internalism is the kind of thorough-going 
internalism advocated by Segal, characterised by the rejection of the standard interpretation of 
difference in truth conditions across Twin-Earth-style scenarios, and ecumenical internalism is 
the kind of 2-factor (or more) theory of narrow content that accepts the standard interpretation 
of difference in truth conditions but acknowledges a further kind of content that is narrow 
nonetheless. Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne offer arguments against each form of internalism in 
turn, making reference to various of the structural and explanatory conditions along the way, 
and in the end ‘remain sceptical that ur-content is to be explained, even in part, in terms of 
some narrow content assignment’ (p. 120).  
Chapter 4, ‘Rationality and narrow content’, is concerned with a family of properties 
and relations relating to a prioricity. Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne consider a wide range of such 
properties including a priori entailment, conditional probability, a priori justification and a 
prioricity itself, arguing with some plausibility that these are not narrow relations and hence do 
not supervene on narrow content assignments. The conclusion is that narrow content cannot 
explain any of the basic properties and relations that are standardly connected with rationality. 
Throughout chapters 1-4, narrowness is defined in terms of supervenience on the purely 
qualitative aspects of the inner lives of agents. This fits with the standard way in which 
internalists think of narrow content ‘as being fixed by the qualitative structure of our inner lives, 
disregarding the particular individual objects in the qualitative nexus’ (p. 17). By contrast, 
chapter 5, ‘Quasi-internalism’, rejects the standard approach to narrow content and develops a 
notion of ‘quasi-narrowness’, defined as strong local supervenience not on Qualitative Agential 
Profile (QAP) but simply on Agential Profile (AP) per se. Quasi-internalism thus appeals to 
both qualitative and non-qualitative intrinsic properties to ground narrow content assignments. 
However, according to Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, not only is such a view not motivated by 
standard Twin Earth thought experiments—since although Oscar and Twin Oscar are QAP-
duplicates, they are not AP-duplicates—the view faces, the ‘threat of pointlessness’ (p. 155) 
since, they say, ‘all content assignments are quasi-narrow’ (p. 156) or, at least ‘quasi-narrow 
content assignments are troublingly plentiful’ (p. 157). There is thus, they say, no significant 
independent role for quasi-narrow content assignments to play. 
Chapter 6, ‘Relational narrowness’, explores an even more radical departure from 
standard internalism by developing a notion of ‘relational-narrowness’, defined as strong local 
supervenience on Relational Qualitative Agential Profile (RQAP). The RQAP (α1, …, αn) of 
a sequence of thoughts <α1, …, αn> having the same agent is defined as ‘the conjunction of all 
qualitative n-place relations R such that, for some (n + 1)-place relation Q,  
 
(i) R = λx1… λxn∃yQ(x1, …, xn, y) 
(ii) Q(α1, …, αn, A (α1)), and 
(iii) Q(y1, …, yn, x) is intrinsic and qualitative’ (p. 167). 
 
And an n-place relation R on thoughts is said to be relationally narrow ‘just in case R 
supervenes on RQAP in the sense that, for all worlds, w, v, for all thoughts α1, …, αn, occurring 
in w and all thoughts β1, …, βn, occurring in v, if RQAP (w, α1, …, αn) = RQAP (w, β1, …, βn) 
then R(w, α1, …, αn) iff R(v, β1, …, βn)’ (p. 168). Although Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne say at 
the beginning of the chapter that the idea of supervenience on RQAP ‘may yet turn out to be a 
passable substitute for narrowness’, and that ‘narrow semantic relations that supervene on 
RQAP may be capable of doing some of the theoretical work that narrow content assignments 
were meant to do’ (p. 167, original emphasis), in the end, this ‘most promising view…in the 
spirit of internalism’ (p. 167) is also found to be fundamentally problematic.  
Narrow Content provides an in-depth examination of one of the key debates of the last 
half-century. It is bold in its ambition, broad in its scope and formal in its approach. Indeed, 
Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne claim that, ‘[b]y comparison with most of the literature’, the book 
makes ‘substantial use of the tools of formal logic’ (p. 17). The authors have nonetheless given, 
they say, ‘informal glosses of all the main claims … so that it is possible to read the book 
without dwelling on the formalized claims’ (p. 17). This means that it remains accessible to 
those less well versed in the formal aspects of analytic philosophy. Although I have raised a 
concern about the framing of the issues, and suggested that there is a kind of narrow content 
that survives the arguments, I have no doubt that the book will be widely read and will be of 
interest to anyone working in the field.  
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